Players may be allowed to both buy and sell the same commodity in a strategic market game. Any outcome of such a game can also be obtained as an outcome of a game in which players either buy or sell. We present a robust example to show that an equilibrium allocation of the buy and sell game may not be so in the corresponding buy or sell game as the set of achievable allocations for any player, given others' strategies, is different in these two games.
Introduction
Shapley and Shubik (Shapley, 1976; Shapley and Shubik, 1977) introduced and developed strategic market games to study the effects of imperfect competition in a general equilibrium framework. In a market game, players may be allowed to both buy and sell the same commodity. Such a buy and sell mechanism has mostly been used in the literature. There are other variations of strategic market games: buy or sell, sell all. It is known that buy or sell and buy and sell games are payoff equivalent; however, the games have considerably different sets of equilibria. As Shapley (1976, p. 168) noted, any Nash equilibrium of any buy or sell game is also a Nash equilibrium for the corresponding buy and sell game. Conversely, a Nash equilibrium of the buy and sell game that happens to satisfy the buy or sell restriction is obviously a Nash equilibrium of the buy or sell game. However, the hold-back option of the buy and sell mechanism makes the set of solutions usually infinite (Shapley and Shubik, 1977, p. 964) .
Consider for example, any (non-zero) Nash equilibrium of a buy and sell market game with only two players. The corresponding strategy profile of the buy or sell game is not an equilibrium as the only Nash equilibrium of the buy or sell game with two players is no trade. This is because in the buy or sell game, for any player, the opponent's strategy is not an interior point and hence a player can grab everything on the market by putting an infinitesimal amount. An example of this sort was presented in Shapley (1976) . One can find a quite different example in Dubey and Shubik (1976) , which was later cited in the printed version (1978) . This note presents a robust example (Example 2) that precisely points out the differences between buy or sell and buy and sell mechanisms: the set of achievable allocations for any player given others' strategies, and therefore the equilibrium set in the 1 buy or sell game, is not the same as that in the original buy and sell game .
The game
Just for the sake of completeness, we here present the model of strategic market games. We closely follow Dubey and Shubik (1978) in this section.
Consider an exchange economy with n agents and (l 1 1) goods. Agents are indexed by i; i 5 1, . . . ,n. First l goods are indexed by j; j 5 1, . . . ,l. The last good is money and is indexed by m. Endowment of agent i is denoted by w 5 (w , . . . ,w , w ) and the utility function of individual i is
given by U : R → R. Let us make standard assumptions that the endowments are strictly positive 
To complete the game, the payoff of player i is
. This is nothing but a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. One can easily characterise
The main point of this note however is true in a stronger sense than just a robust example. As Dubey and Rogawski (1990) proved, for generic utilities, the codimension of the set of interior Nash equilibria, in a buy and sell game, is n(l 2 1) where n is the number of players and l is the number of commodities, and that in a buy or sell game is zero (i.e., the set is generically finite). The set of equilibria of these two games may coincide when interior equilibria do not exist because of 'not enough money' (as shown rigorously by Dubey and Shapley (1994) for a continuum of players). I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this remark. i plays a strategy (q , b ) against (q , b ), the price of good j would be p 5
, where, (B ) 5 o b and (Q ) 5 o q Given others' strategies, the final allocation of
player i depends only on the price. It is also easy to find the best response of player i against others' strategies.
Examples
One can easily observe that any outcome of a buy and sell game generated by a strategy profile (q, b) can be obtained as an outcome of a buy or sell game in which each player i has either a net supply or a net demand of good j, depending on the sign of the expression ((B ) 2 p (Q ) )/p (which is The price of the good is 1. The strategy profile ((0, 1), (1, 0)) of the corresponding buy or sell game would generate the same outcome.
Example 1b. Consider the strategies (q 5 1, b 5 1) and (q 5 1, b 5 1) for the buy and sell game. The price is 1 in this case as well. The outcome is generated by the no-bid strategy, (0, 0), in the corresponding buy or sell game in which the market does not open.
We are now interested in any individual's achievable outcomes and thereby the set of equilibria of the games. The set of achievable allocations of any player depends crucially on the total bid and offer made by the opponents. An equilibrium strategy profile of any buy and sell game may not correspond to an equilibrium in the corresponding buy or sell game even when, in the buy or sell game, the total bid and offer made by the opponents are strictly positive, as the set of achievable allocations for any player may be different. Thus, the games, buy and sell, buy or sell, are not individual decision equivalent (Ray, 2001) The following example which uses a two-fold replica of the economy described in Example 1, clarifies all our remarks.
Example 2. Consider a market game with four players and two goods only. The first two agents are identical in their endowments and preferences and the last two also have identical endowments and preferences. Suppose the endowments are W 5 W 5 (2, 5), W 5 W 5 (5, 2) and the utility functions this buy and sell game. It is easy to prove that this profile forms a Nash equilibrium. In the corresponding buy or sell game, the strategy profile ((0, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 0)) generates the same outcome. However, it is not an equilibrium as either player 1 or 2 can deviate and be better off. a The best allocation for player 1 (and 2) shown in the table is an approximate value of the exact solution of the optimization problem: max (15 / 16) ln x 1 ln y subject to xy 2 6x 2 4y 1 22 5 0.
The above table clearly explains all the features of the relationship between the two games. Any outcome, in particular, an equilibrium outcome, of the buy and sell game can be obtained as an outcome of the buy or sell game; but the equilibrium outcome may not be an equilibrium in the buy or sell game, because the individual's set of achievable allocations may be different. The two sets of achievable allocations, i.e., the two hyperbolas, must have (at least) two allocations in common, the endowment point and the outcome in question. For example the hyperbolas xy 2 9x 2 7y 1 43 5 0 and xy 2 6x 2 4y 1 22 5 0 cut each other at points (2, 5) and (3, 4).
The equilibrium allocation is therefore still achievable by any player in the buy or sell game but it may not be the best allocation for some of them. In the above example, for all four players, the two sets of achievable allocations, i.e., the two hyperbolas, are different; still, for players 3 and 4, the allocation in question, (4, 3) , is the best allocation they can achieve. However, for players 1 and 2, the allocation in question, (3, 4), is not the best. Player 1 (or 2) can, for example, play the strategy (0, 0.7) to achieve a better allocation, given others' strategies.
